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Abstract  
Public opinion does not fall out of the sky. What passes for public opinion in the European 
Union is largely the answers of its citizens to questions posed in surveys commissioned and 
controlled by the European Commission. This paper presents the first systematic mapping of 
the topics and non-topics of the 400 so-called Special Eurobarometers: reports based on 
batteries of questions about specific policy issues posed in face-to-face interviews to about 
25,000 citizens, constituting nationally representative samples of all member states. This 
exploration is especially relevant against the background of the increased politicisation of the 
EU;  both  given  the  potential  value  of  public  opinion  as  a  “substitute”  for  a  more  direct  link  to  
the electorate and as a power resource in decision-making. We chart the frequency of Special 
EBs over time, identify the topics (and non-topics) using the  Comparative  Agenda  Project’s  
EU codebook, and relate their frequency to the distribution of competencies between the EU 
and its member states. We also document the variation across DGs in their effort to gauge 
public opinion. We conclude that the Commission is increasingly seeking public opinion and 
that it does so in a very broad range of policy areas. We find a curvilinear relationship 
between the degree of EU competencies and the frequency of Special EBs. Citizen input is less 
sought in areas where the EU already has far reaching competencies and in areas which are 
clearly in the national (or even sub-national)   domain.   The   lion’s   share   of   Special   EBs   is  
conducted in the realm of shared competencies, with an emphasis on those areas where the 
EU got involved relatively recently. We also detected only two Special EBs specifically related 
to the redistribution of resources (e.g., cohesion policy) and none on immigration. We also 
find a large variation across the DGs on whose behalf Special EBs are conducted. Three DGs 
are responsible for half of all EBs and nine DGs for less than five percent. These results open 
up promising avenues for research on the responsiveness of the European Commission and 
its agenda setting strategies and legitimacy seeking behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘The concept of enhancing the link between Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) 
payments and environmental protection throughout the EU and limiting the amount 
of payments any individual farm can receive are broadly supported by EU citizens, 
according  to  a  EUROBAROMETER  opinion  poll  published  today’…’  EU  
Agriculture  Commissioner  Dacian  Cioloș  welcomed  the  poll'ʹs  findings,  stating  today:  
‘I  have  always  underlined  that the CAP is not just for farmers, but for all EU citizens. 
This poll confirms that some of the key concepts of our reform – such as "Greening" 
and  "ʺCapping"ʺ  have  wide  public  support.’  (European  Commission,  2011) 
 
‘It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  Eurobarometer is an instrument created and 
financed by a political institution. It is therefore inconceivable that it could somehow 
damage  that  institution  with  the  publication  of  adverse  results  in  this  regard’   
(Signorelli 2012: 69) 
 
Public opinion does not fall out of the sky. In fact, what passes for public 
opinion in the European Union consists largely of the answers of European 
Union citizens to questions regularly posed to them in surveys commissioned 
and controlled by the European Commission. These surveys do not only 
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enquire about general citizen attitudes towards the EU. In fact, around 400 
times thousands of EU citizens have been surveyed through face-to-face 
interviews about specific policy topics ranging from nuclear waste disposal to 
sex tourism, from disaster management to breast cancer, from food safety to 
child care, and from corruption to public service liberalization. Questions may 
concern the   citizens’   problem   perceptions,   their   behaviour,   their   awareness  
and evaluations of current EU policies, their preferred policy solutions and 
the level (national or EU) at which action should be taken.  
 
Specific exemplars of these so-called Special Eurobarometers occasionally 
raise the interests of scholars working in in a particular policy area, but to our 
knowledge there has never been a systematic overall mapping of these 
massive investments in gauging citizen opinion (however, see Signorelli 
20121). This lacuna is surprising for a number of reasons.  
 
From a normative perspective the Special EBs can be viewed as a potentially 
important link between the Commission and citizens. This link may become 
more relevant in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, which marked the 
end of the permissive consensus: winning support for further integration at 
referenda cannot be taken for granted, Eurosceptic parties have been 
established and have increased in importance, and trust in the EU is declining 
in the member states (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2008). As a response, European 
institutions, and in particular the European Commission, claim to seek wider 
societal input by reaching out towards civil society organizations and the 
public  at  large.  After  the  Dutch  and  French  ‘no’  on  a  European  Constitution,  
the   European   Commission   drafted   an   ‘Action   Plan   to   improve  
communicating  Europe’  (2005).                                                           1 In the course of our research it came to our attention that a policy paper by the think tank Notre Europe contains information covering the same ground as the third part of our analysis: the number of Special EBs requested by each DG (Signorelli 2012).  
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The action plan states that:  
‘Communication establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European 
citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people. It is not a neutral exercise 
devoid of value; it is an essential part of the political process (European Commission, 
2005: 3).  
 
According to the Commission, one of the most important elements of this 
‘listening   process’   is   the   analysis   of   Eurobarometer   data   (European  
Commission, 2005: 8).  
 
While some instruments to link citizens to the EU, such as internet 
consultations, have received scholarly attention (see e.g. Persson 2007, Kohler-
Koch 2012), the Special EBs have not yet been systematically addressed, even 
though citizens can express their opinion directly in these interviews without 
mediation by NGOs or other actors. Public opinion could be seen by the 
Commission as a substitute for the direct electoral link with citizens, as a 
weak  form  of  ‘input’   legitimacy  when  it  comes  to  developing  new  proposals  
and  ‘output’  legitimacy  regarding  the  evaluation of existing policies (Scharpf 
1999). The first quote in the beginning of this paper illustrates the use of the 
results  of  a  Special  Eurobarometer  for  claiming  this  ‘output’  legitimacy. 
 
Also and related to the former point, assuming that the Commission is at least 
partly an agent with own interests, the end of the permissive consensus might 
also have caused a shift in the strategy of the Commission to claim its 
importance. Majone and many other scholars have conceptualized the 
Commission as an institution that tries to expand its influence by expanding 
the legislative scope of EU policy (Cram, 1993; Majone, 1996; Wendon, 1998: 
340; Pollack, 2003: 35; Wonka, 2008; 1146, Hartlapp et al. 2014).  As Princen 
has  argued  “the  European  Commission  and   other   supra-national actors had 
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to demonstrate to a larger extent than the established national governments 
that  ‘their’  level  is  the  appropriate  level  to  deal  with  the  issue  at  hand.”  (2011:  
940).  Empirical research has demonstrated that the Commission used to 
follow a depoliticized route of agenda setting, through relatively close policy 
(expert) communities (Princen & Rhinard, 2006; 1121). Against the 
background of the end of the permissive consensus, the results of the Special 
EBs may help to build credibility for new EU proposals. If a (large) majority of 
citizens in a (large) majority of countries declare that a topic should be tackled 
on the EU level, this should give the Commission a powerful resource to put 
the issue on the EU political agenda. At the same time, once an issue is dealt 
with on the EU agenda, the Commission may seek public support through 
public opinion research that helps her to argue in favour of goals, instruments 
and institutional forms that the Commission prefers. As the same questions 
are asked in all countries, the Commission might even claim to have tapped 
into the European public opinion. Hence the Commission may have an 
incentive to take citizen views into account as an important resource for their 
policy activities, in addition to expertise and support of organized interests 
(Haverland 2013).  
 
As the results of Special EBs are public, the Commission may want to avoid a 
situation where a majority of citizens in a majority of countries voice an 
opinion that is detrimental to the Commission’s interests. As the Commission 
is in the driving seat with regards to which topics are to be addressed and 
which are not   (“non-topics”),   the   Special   Eurobarometer   might   not   be   the  
innocent instrument it appears at first glance.  
 
These considerations raise a lot interesting research questions. The purpose of 
this paper has a rather modest explorative aim, however. We seek to answer 
the following questions: 
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First, against the background of the end of the permissive consensus, we 
wonder whether the European Commission increasingly seeks public 
opinion. In other words, we assess whether the number of Special EBs has 
increased over time. 
 
Secondly, as the Commission is not obliged to seek public opinion but has to 
publish the results if it does so, we wonder on which topics the Commission 
surveys citizens and on which topics it does not. We will also relate the 
frequency of topics to the competencies of the EU as expressed in the Lisbon 
Treaty. This admittedly broad-brush approach helps to get a first insight into 
whether the Commission is more likely to invite public opinion in areas 
where they have comparatively more competencies.  
 
Thirdly, we tap into differences within the Commission. The Commission is 
not a monolith. In fact, empirical research has demonstrated quite a measure 
of bureaucratic politics among its component parts: the Directorates General 
(DGs) (see e.g. Hartlapp et al. 2014). Special EBs are requested by specific DGs 
within the Commission. Hence results of Special EBs might not only be used 
as a resource vis-à-vis other political actors but also as a resource in inter-
departmental negotiations within the Commission. Therefore, we map the 
frequency by which a DG requests Special EBs. For instance, we assess 
whether a Special Eurobarometer concerning the single market actually 
requested by DG Internal Market and Services or for instance by DG Health 
and Consumer Protection.  
 
To  be  sure,  our  aim  is  ‘only’  an  exercise  in  mapping  and  exploration.  We  do  
not present evidence as to what is actually done with the results of the Special 
EBs. We wish to strongly emphasize, however, the simple but important fact 
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that   having   public   opinion   on   an   issue   is   a   precondition   for   “producing  
salience”.   Citizens’   opinions   cannot   matter,   at   least   not by means of the 
Special Eurobarometer, if they are not measured. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we will fist provide general information about 
the Eurobarometer surveys and their three main formats: Special EBs, 
Standard EBs and Flash EBs. In Section three, we will briefly review existing 
critical studies on the Eurobarometer. We will then elaborate on our design 
(Section 4). Sections five, six and seven will address our empirical results: the 
development in frequency of Special EBs over time, the topics addressed and 
neglected, and variations in the DGs who requested Special EBs. In the 
conclusion, we sketch research questions for future research.  
 
 
2. The Eurobarometer: Standard, Special and Flash  
 
The Eurobarometer started off as a small scientific experiment in the 1963, 
with “L’opinion  publique  et   l’Europe  des  Six”.  After two other surveys in 1970 
and 1971, the Commission decided in 1973 to start a bi-yearly poll to gauge 
‘European  public  opinion’  on  a  regular  basis  (Signorelli,  2012;  13).  Since then, 
questions are posed to a representative sample of about 1000 citizens per 
member state at least two times a year.2 The Eurobarometer is coordinated by 
the Commission, more specifically the Directorate General for 
Communication and currently carried out by TNS Opinion and Social, an 
international network of polling institutes, including for instance TNS NIPO 
in the Netherlands and TNS Infratest in Germany. Data are stored and made 
publicly accessible at the GESIS Leibniz Institute for Social Science.                                                         2 The exceptions are Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus with about 500 interviews per country. 
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Although mostly controlled by the European Commission, the European 
Parliament created in 2007 the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit to conduct 
their own Eurobarometer surveys (Signorelli, 2012; 17). According to 
Signorelli, the Eurobarometer can therefore be seen   as   ‘something   of   a  
trademark  that  can  be  used  by  the  two  institutions’  (Signorelli,  2012;  17).   
 
The Standard Eurobarometer is made up of a set of questions that are posed 
repeatedly   over   time.   These   ‘trend’   questions   concern   general   attitudes  
towards life and society, European integration and European institutions, and 
socio-demographic characteristics. There are also questions included, which 
tap into materialist and post-materialist values, reflecting the involvement of 
the eminent social scientist Ronald Inglehart in the early day of the 
Eurobarometer (GESIS, n.d.).  The Standard Eurobarometer produces a 
wealth of cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Therefore, although mainly 
conducted   for   ‘policy   counselling   reasons’   (Saris   &   Kaase1997a:   4),   the  
Eurobarometer surveys are also hailed for their value for comparative social 
science research (Reif & Inglehart, 1991: xv). 
 
However, the large-scale surveys conducted under the label Eurobarometer 
do not only contain the above-mentioned categories of questions. In fact 
citizens are also surveyed about a great variety of specific policy topics. 
Typically, batteries of questions regarding these specific topics are requested 
by various DGs of the European Commission, or sometimes other EU 
institutions, for in-depth thematic studies (about 100 pages long), the so-
called Special Eurobarometer (Signorelli, 2012; 26). These thematic studies are 
the focus of this paper. 
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According   to   an   official   of   the   Commission’s   Eurobarometer   unit,   there is 
currently space for about 40 Special EBs a year. There is also a policy to have 
no more than 3 Special EBs a year per DG. The final list is decided on a high 
hierarchical   level   involving   for   instance   the   heads   of   the   Commissioners’  
cabinets and highly ranked communication advisors. Selection into the final 
list is based on the Commission priorities, which currently includes for 
instance employment and growth. The official felt unable to comment on the 
pre-Barroso period, though he expects that the process was more 
decentralized back then (European Commission 2014).  
 
Initially, the two yearly waves of the Eurobarometer were used as an omnibus 
survey including the trend questions (Standard Eurobarometer) and the 
questions belonging to Special EBs. As we will see below, however, the 
number of Special EBs has increased significantly. A single survey can only 
contain a limited number of questions in order to be feasible, which is set at 
about 150 questions for the Eurobarometer. Therefore, there have been an 
increasing number of separate waves that only include questions for Special 
EBs. In other words, while it is widely believed that the Commission runs two 
surveys   a   year,   it   actually   runs   much  more.   The   spring   ‘wave’   of   2013   for  
instance consisted of four waves instead of one wave (79.1-79.4). 3 
 
In addition, since 2000, Flash EBs have also been conducted. Flash EBs are 
smaller in scale. They consist of telephone interviews, rather than face-to-face 
contact and often either focus on a specific target groups, such as 
                                                        3 Since the early 1990s there have also been occasionally qualitative studies using focus groups. There have been 27 studies until November 2014, with 13 of them in the last five years (see European Commission, n.d.).  
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entrepreneurs  or  “the  youths”,  or  on  one  or  a  few  countries.  There  were 405 
Flash EBs until November 2014.4  
 
 
3. Previous research on the Eurobarometer 
 
To be sure, there have already been critical examinations of the 
Eurobarometer. These have had a different focus, however. Almost all studies 
concerned methodological issues such as sampling problems and cultural 
biases (e.g. Saris and Kaase 1997b). The study by Höpner and Jurczyk is one 
of   the   few   that   take   a  more   ‘political’   approach,   by   linking  methodological  
problems with a potential pro-integration bias of the Commission (2012). 
These authors have reviewed the German versions of those waves of the 
Eurobarometer that have been conducted between 1995 and 2010. Against a 
template of ten basic principles of good survey questions, they evaluated the 
quality of the questions and found a violation of seven principles. The authors 
emphasize that given the great number of questions, deviations from the ideal 
of survey questions are not surprising, but they argue that the deviations had 
such a systematic character that they amount to evidence for the strategic 
manipulation of questions (2012: 345). Also, there is anecdotal evidence by 
Signorelli, who has worked for the Commission. He cites the case of a Flash 
Eurobarometer about Iraq and the peace in the world, where the Commission 
– although ultimately unsuccessfully – tried to hide that almost 60 per cent of 
Europeans regarded Israel as the most important threat to international peace 
(Signorelli 2012: 69-70).   Signorelli   also  mentions   the   “membership   is   a  good  
thing”  questions.  This   trend  question   has  been  asked   since   the earlier 1970s                                                         4 We have explored these surveys as well and arrive at similar patterns with some exceptions. We will report these exceptions because in these instances the Flash Eurobarometer can be regarded as a functional equivalent compensating for a lack of attention by the Special Eurobarometer.   
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but not after 2011, or at least for the current member states. A reason for this 
omission could be that the percentage of people who see EU membership as a 
‘good  thing’  has  dropped  below  50  per  cent,  with  even  lower  results  for  some  
countries.   Signorelli   therefore   concludes   that   “[t]he   political   interest   behind  
the  decision  to  not  include  a  “Trend”  question  that  reflects  the  difficult  period  
that  the  EU  is  going  through  is  obvious  here”  (2012;  66).   
 
None of these studies, nor any other studies we are aware of, have however 
systematically explored the topics and non- topic of Special EBs. This study 
tries to fill part of this void by a first mapping and exploration of Special EBs. 
 
 
4. Research design 
 
The paper provides a systematic description and exploration of characteristics 
of Special EBs. The population of Special Eurobarometer reports is available 
through  the  Commission’s  website  (European Commission n.d). There are 400 
Special EBs listed for the period 1970 to November 2014.5 The dates of 
fieldwork   for   the   survey   and   the   publication   of   the   surveys’   report   are  
mentioned, which allows for tracing the frequency of surveys over time. The 
topics of the Special Eurobarometer are inferred from the title of the Special 
Eurobarometer report. If the title was ambiguous, the report was downloaded 
and read. The topics have been manually coded by two researchers 
independently using the EU codebook of the Comparative Agenda Setting                                                         5 Officially the last Special Eurobarometer of our period of research carries the number 419. But not all numbers appear on the website. For instance, the website entails the numbers 303, 307, 308 and 313, but not the numbers in between. We do not exclude the possibility that this indicates that Special EBs that are hided from the public, but based on our experience with coding the data we believe that that this rather an administrative artefact, the result of 
decentralized	   management,	   e.g.	   Special	   EB’s	   requested	   but	   the	   results	   never	   analyzed	   for	  idiosyncratic reasons, and the fact that some reports have been assigned sub-numbers and 
therefore	  ‘main’	  numbers	  left	  vacant.	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Project (Alexandrova et al. 2013). The EU codebook is a slight adaptation of 
the US codebook. The US codebook distinguishes   22   policy   areas   (‘main  
topics’),  basically  all  areas  of  government  activities  conceivable.  Although  the  
EU codebook specifies certain codes to make it better workable in the EU 
context, it keeps the comprehensive scope of the original. No policy areas are 
excluded. The EU codebook is regularly updated and we use the most recent 
codebook available at the time of writing. All Special EB reports, save one, 
contain the name of the actor that has requested the Eurobarometer. In 
addition, 15 reports (4 per cent) are not available for download, thereby 
resulting in missing values for the actor requesting the Eurobarometer and in 
some cases for the topic as well (as the title was too ambiguous to infer the 
topic code).  
 
 
5. Increase in the production of public opinion? 
 
The first question we posed was whether the European Commission 
increasingly seeks public opinion through Special EBs. Looking at the 
population of Special EBs, we see indeed a dramatic increase over time. 
Before the 1990s, hardly more than five Special EBs a year have been 
conducted. In the 1990s, the average was almost ten Special EBs a year, and in 
the 2000s the average further increased to about 15 (see Figure 1).  
From the 1980s on, each Commission has executed more Special EBs than its 
predecessors, with the exception of the short-lived Delors III Commission. 
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Figure 1: Number of Special EBs a year per presidency 
 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculations, total: 3926 
 
 
6. Topics addressed and neglected 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that the European Commission is 
increasingly commissioning Special EBs. It also shows that the European 
Parliament has become increasingly involved and that sometimes other actors 
request Special EBs. For the remainder of the paper, however, we want to 
focus on the European Commission which is responsible for 360 of the 392 
Special EBs for which we were able to locate the requesting institution.  
                                                        6 The start and end dates of each EC presidency were found on:  http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/president/history/.  Eight Special EBs which were commissioned by the European Parliament were missing on the EC website. They were retrieved from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00191b53ff/Eurobarometer.html  
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This section addresses the question for which topics opinion is sought and for 
which  topics  not  or  in  other  words  where  the  Commission  ‘produces  salience’  
and  where  it  ‘keeps  citizens  silent’.   
 
Figure 2: Topics addressed in Special EBs 
 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculation, total: 32078 
 
As stated before, the topics are coded according to the EU codebook of the 
Comparative Agenda Setting Project. This codebook is a slight adaptation of a 
coding scheme initially developed for national policy-making. As Figure 2 
reveals, Special EBs are commissioned in almost all areas that are also the 
domain of national policy making (see also below).                                                          7 We focused on the 360 Special EBs which are commissioned by the European Commission (in general or by a specific DG). However, forty Special EBs are too general to be meaningfully coded into one of the categories of the codebook,	  such	  as	  ‘social	  climate’.	  This	  leaves	  us	  with	  320	  Special	  EBs.foo 8 The numbers between brackets are the absolute number of Special EBs per topic.  
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In comparing the relative importance of different policy areas it is difficult to 
establish a benchmark. Where would one expect more or less effort to gauge 
public opinion? A useful starting point to us seems the degree to which the 
EU has competencies in the respective policy area. We have mapped  the 
relative share of different topics on the division of competencies as stipulated 
by the Lisbon Treaty that has been adopted in 2007 and enacted in 2009 (see 
Table 1). This allows us to gain a rough picture as to whether the relative 
share is related to the degree to which competencies are located at the EU 
level. As the Lisbon Treaty is the most recent EU treaty and as there is no 
policy area where the Lisbon Treaty stipulates less EU competencies than any 
prior treaty (see e.g. Bӧrzel 2005, Hix 2005: 20-21), this amounts to 
conservative   measurement   for   Special   EB’s   conducted   prior   to   the Lisbon 
Treaty: if a Special EB is conducted in a policy area in which according to the 
Lisbon Treaty the EU has no or minor competencies, the EU had not more 
competencies at the time the Special EB has actually been conducted. 
Notwithstanding this, we will also report significant longitudinal variation in 
the appearance of topics.  
 
 In the Annex to this paper we explicate how the codebook’s   categories   of  
main topics, and if necessary sub-topics, have been aligned with the 
categories of EU policy competencies (see Annex). 
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Table 1: Topics addressed in Eurobarometer mapped on division of competencies Lisbon Treaty9  
 
Exclusive competences of European Union Customs union 0 Competition 0 Monetary policy for the Euro-countries 6 The conservation of marine biological resources  0 Common Commercial Policy (External trade ) 3 
 
Shared competences Internal market 2110 Social policy, as defined in TFEU 5 Economic, social and territorial cohesion; 2 Agriculture and fisheries, excl. Conservation of marine res. 28 Environment 22 Consumer protection 14 Transport 7 Energy 14 Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 39 Public health as defined in TFEU 28 Research, technological development and space 33 Development cooperation and humanitarian aid 18 
 
Specific arrangements Coordination of economic policies 7 Coordination of employment policies 8 Coordination of social policy 12 Common foreign and security policy 6 
 
Exclusive Competencies Member States Protection and improvement of human health 10 Culture 3 Tourism 2 Education, vocational training, youth and sport 10 Civil protection; 1 Housing and Urban Developmenta 0 Public Lands and Watermanagementa 0   a Added by authors, not mentioned in the TFEU 
 
                                                        9 This	  table	  is	  based	  on	  all	  Special	  EB’s	  commissioned by the European Commission (360) that could be meaningfully coded into one of the categories of the codebook (360->320). We excluded those that focus on EU Governance and Government Operations as such (320->301). Due to additional considerations provided in the Annex, the final number analysed amounts to 299 (see Annex).  10 Many of these EBs take a consumer perspective but do not specifically deal with consumer protection  
Producing salience or keeping silence? 
16   
Let us start with policies in the realm of exclusive EU competencies.  Overall, 
not   many   Special   EB’s   have   been   conducted   in   these   areas.   Common 
commercial policies, or in other words foreign trade, an area that is strongly 
related to economic globalization, is an exclusive competence of the European 
Union for already quite a long time. Yet, only three Special EBs (less than 1 
per cent) have been devoted to this topic. On competition policy (merger 
control, state aid etc.), another area with a history of strong EU competencies, 
not a single Special EB has been carried out.  The same holds for the Customs 
Union and the conservation of marine biological resources. Six Special EBs have 
dealt with monetary policy or more specifically with the ECU or the EURO. 
None of them were requester after 2002 however, despite the crisis in the 
Eurozone which has evolved since 2008.11 Overall this exploration suggests 
that the European Commission does not prioritize public opinion research in 
areas where the EU (already) has exclusive competencies. 
 
How is the situation at the other side of the spectrum, areas of exclusive 
member state competencies? In many areas that belong to the national 
domain (or sometimes even the sub-national domain) the Commission is 
indeed rather inactive. There are only three EBs on cultural issues, six on 
education (including vocational training) and none on public lands and water 
management. There have been three Special EBs that fall in the category of 
regional and urban planning. None of them actually dealt with purely regional 
or local issues. Rather, they deal with EU-related  aspects,  two  on   ‘European  
and  the  Regions’  and  one  on  social-economic aspects of regions in Europe (see 
below). We consider health an exception to this. There have been ten Special 
EBs on health issues and the healthcare system. Note that these do not 
concern those health issues, where the EU has shared competencies (see                                                         11 Note however that public perceptions concerning Euro-related issues are yearly monitored by Flash EBs for Euro-zone citizens since 2000 (Commission n.d.) 
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below). Finally one might also wonder why the Commission has conducted 
four Special EBs on sport.  
 
Moving up  the  ‘ladder’  again  towards  more  integrated  areas  we  arrive  at  the  
so-called specific arrangements. These arrangements basically denote 
decision-making by intergovernmental bargaining and coordination, rather 
than the Community method. There are two broad areas here (socio-) 
economic policy and common foreign and security policy. 
 
In terms of economic coordination seven Special EBs have been conducted by 
the Commission, dealing with inter alia demographic issues, the European 
citizens’  knowledge  of  economic  indicators  and  ‘undeclared  work’  in  the  EU.  
The Commission has conducted one Special EB on unemployment (in 1977) 
and none on budgets and on taxation. This implies that citizens have not yet 
been invited by the Commission to provide their opinion on the economic 
crisis in the Eurozone and recent policies under the label of European 
economic governance, at least not through the Special Eurobarometer. Note 
however, that two Special EBs on the economic crisis have been conducted on 
behalf of the European Parliament.12  
 
The Commission has been more active in the area of social policies, in the sense 
of welfare policies, which are since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) subject to 
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). There are 13 Special EBs, with 
eight of them dealing with poverty and social exclusion, some of them pre-
dating the introduction of the OMC.  Most of the eight Special EB in the area 
of employment policies are close to social issues as well, and again some of 
them are from the pre-OMC era.                                                          12 Note also that the yearly Flash EBs concerning Euro-related issues also contain questions about European economic governance, see also Footnote 11 (Commission n.d.)  
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We can be briefer on the other main area of specific arrangements: common 
security and foreign policy. There are considerably less Special EB’s   here   than  
concerning the previously discussed economic and social policy issues. We 
counted  six  Special  EB’s  in  total.  Note  that  the  Commission  never  conducted  a  
Special EB on defence.  
 
The lion’s   share   of   Special   EBs is conducted in the areas of shared 
competencies. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of them concern the single 
market, the core project of EU integration. Twenty-one of them focus on 
various aspects of the internal market (about half of those related to services), 
taking mostly a consumer perspective. In addition, 14 Special EBs focus on 
consumer protection in a narrower sense. 
 
There are also many surveys concerning Agriculture, one of the oldest EU 
policy areas. However, none of the 28 surveys dealt specifically with what 
might be regarded the core of the CAP, agricultural subsidies and the 
common organization of agricultural markets. Note, however, that some 
surveys  include  issues  in  these  domains  such  as  ‘capping’,  but they are not a 
prominent part of these more general inquiries. In contrast to this, we counted 
seven Special EBs on food safety and seven on biotechnology, for instance.  
This implies that citizen opinion is invited on the regulatory aspects of 
agriculture rather than its redistributive aspects.  
 
That redistribution is rather a non-issue is further confirmed by the low 
number of Special EBs concerning cohesion policies. In terms of social cohesion, 
there has been one survey on the European Social Funds. Likewise, in terms 
of territorial cohesion only one Special EB explicitly touches upon EU wide 
inter-regional redistribution and that one is from 1980. In other words, for the 
last three decades, citizens were not asked about the largest redistributive 
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programmes the EU is running, the EU Cohesion funds. Note also, that there 
has never been a Special Eurobarometer about the EU budget as such. 
 
Analysing the other areas of shared competencies we can make a preliminary 
distinction between domains where the EU already has competencies for a 
long time and areas where the EU has only recently gained competencies. We 
find relatively less Special EBs in the ´old´ areas and they are relatively 
speaking from older vintage.13 This holds for the five surveys concerning 
Social Policy as defined in the TFEU, that is health and safety at the work place 
and working conditions, the seven surveys on transport policy, and also for 
those on energy (14) the environment (22) and development aid (18).  
 
We find more and relatively more recent activity concerning relatively new 
EU competencies. Twenty-eight surveys have been conducted in the area of 
public health including surveys on cancer, aids, drug abuse, smoking, alcohol, 
health risks related to the sun and to electric magnetic fields, and even mental 
health, oral health, blood donation and blood transfusions.14 
 
We have counted 33 Special EBs dealing with research, technological 
developments and space. Since 1977 Europeans have been regularly quizzed 
about their view on science and technology, but in the last 15 years this have 
been supplemented with regular surveys on the usage of internets in 
households and on  the  ‘information  society’.  No  less  than  39  Special  EBs have 
been conducted concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, and almost 
all of them in the last decade. Eighteen deal with civil rights issues, such as 
EU citizenship, gender equality, racism, and data privacy. Twenty one deal                                                         13 This does not hold for the Single Market and Agricultural Policy. Over the last forty years they received a roughly constant share of attention.  14 Two Special Eurobarometer on public health actually consist of a series of thematical studies (six and seven respectively, indicated by sub-numbers	  on	  the	  Commission’s	  website).	  We	  did	  not	  count them on the sub-number level. Hence our measure is conservative in this respect. 
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with law and crime issues such as violence and white collar crimes like 
corruption. At the same time, there has not been a single Special EB (sic) that 
has focused on an immigration issue, such as refugees and asylum issues, the 
integration of immigrants, acquisition of nationality or border control.  
 
Overall we find a roughly curvilinear pattern with relatively less Special EBs 
in areas where the EU already has far reaching competencies and in areas 
where policy issues are clearly (sub-) national. The lion’s share of Special EBs 
is conducted in areas of shared competencies, and here we counted more 
Special EBs, and also on average on more recent vintage, in areas where the 
EU has gained competencies more recently. 
 
 
7. Variation within the Commission in gauging public 
opinion 
 
As stated above, Special EBs are not requested by the European Commission 
as such but rather by a specific Directorate General (DG). Although the 
Commission is organized according to the principle of functional 
specialization,   topics   are   not   always   ‘owned’  by  a   specific  DG.  Many   topics  
cut across several DGs, requiring coordination and potentially conflict and 
bureaucratic politics (see e.g. Hartlapp et al. 2014). It is therefore worthwhile 
to map which DG has actually requested the Special Eurobarometer.  
 
For labelling the DGs we did not always use their proper names at the time 
when the Special EBs were requested. Otherwise it would not be possible to 
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study DGs over a long period of time.15 Our labelling is informed by the 
portfolio of the Barroso I Commission. This implies for instance, that we pool 
the data for DG Energy and DG Move into the category DG Energy and 
Transport. We have also pooled  for DG Home and DG Justice (into DG 
Justice, Freedom and Security), DG Agriculture and Rural Development into 
and DG Fisheries (DG Agriculture) and DG Environment and DG Climate 
Change (DG Environment). 
 
We found that DGs vary starkly in their effort to gauge public opinion (see 
Figure 4). Three DGs are responsible for about half of the Special EBs. Quite a 
few Special EBs are carried out by DG Communication itself. Further analysis 
reveals that these are typically more general topics or topics that cut across 
many issues, such as the future of the EU or German re-unification. From the 
DGs with a policy portfolio, DG Employment and Social Affairs and DG 
Health and Consumer Affairs are the directorates that by far request the most 
Special EBs.  
 
On the other end, there are some DGs who never or almost never seek the 
opinion of European citizens through Special EBs. The following group of 
nine  DGs  are   responsible   for   in   total   less   than  5  per   cent  of   all   ‘Special  EBs  
(15/345)16: DG Enterprise, DG Regional Policy, DG Trade, DG Economic and 
Finance, DG External Relations, DG Enlargement, DG Competition, DG 
Budget and DG Taxation and Customs Union. The latter three have not 
requested a single Special EB. 
                                                         15 Since the start of the Eurobarometer in the early 1970s, new DGs have been created, DG´s have been split up, DG have assumed new tasks and or have given away some of their tasks, and accordingly the number, their tasks and their names have constantly changed.  16 We were unable to identify the responsible DG for 15 Special EBs, because these EBs were not 
available	   for	  download	  on	   the	  Commission’s	  website. Hence, the number of Special EBs is this analysis is 345 instead of 360.  
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Figure 4: Special EBs per requesting DG 
 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculations, total nr. 34517 
 
In other words, especially those DGs tasked with economic and foreign affairs 
issues almost never invite the opinion of European citizens. This is consistent 
with the results of our previous section, where we have seen that there are 
indeed only very few Special EBs in the area of foreign and security policies 
and core areas of economic policies areas such as competition policy, external 
trade policy, taxation and the budget.  
 
At the same time citizens have been frequently surveyed about some 
particular economic issues, in particular those related to the internal market.                                                         17 See Footnote 17.  
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But as stated above these surveys often either take a consumer perspective or 
explicitly deal with consumer protection. It is typically not DG Internal 
Market or DG Enterprise who request Special EBs related to the internal 
market broadly understood, but DG Health and Consumer Protection (see 
Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: EC Directorate-generals	  requesting	  Special	  EBs	  in	  ‘Banking,	  Finance	  and	  
Internal	  Market’18 
 
Source: European Commission (1970-2014), own calculations: 37 
 
The large number of Special EBs for DG Health and Consumer Protection is 
based on activities in both areas of its responsibility: health and consumer 
protection.  
 
The large number of Special EBs on behalf of DG Employment and Social 
Affairs is a result of the fact that this DG is responsible for almost all Special 
EBs in the area of Social Policy and of Employment Policy. In addition, this                                                         18 Note that this table is based on the relevant category of the agenda codebook. The codebook collapses a number of categories of EU policy competencies: internal market in a narrow sense, consumer protection, and tourism.  
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DG is also responsible for nine of the 18 Special EBs in the category of civil 
rights focusing on discrimination, of for instance women or disabled people.  
 
In addition, taking a longitudinal perspective suggests that DGs of relative 
recent vintages and tasked with subjects that have not been part of the 
original EEC Treaty are relatively eager to invite public opinion. For example, 
since  Barroso  II,  the  DG  in  the  area  “Justice,  Freedom  and  Security”  has  been  
split into DG Justice and DG Home Affairs. Both have started to request 
Special EBs.  Also DGs dealing with the Information Society, Communication 
Networks and Education and Culture have conducted Special EBs from the 
start. This is consistent with the findings of the previous section, which 
documented heavy use of surveys in areas where the EU has gained 
competencies relatively recently. 
 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Against the background of the increased politicization of the European Union, 
this paper presents the first systematic exploration of Special EBs: large scale 
public opinion surveys on specific policy topics commissioned and controlled 
by the European Commission. These surveys may constitute an important 
and hitherto neglected link between the European Commission and citizens. 
They may also provide an increasingly important power resource to the 
Commission. The amount of Special EBs has increased from almost none in 
the  80’s,  to  around  10  a  year  in  the  90’s,  to  around  15  a  year  in  the  2000’s.   
 
Overall, Special EBs are conducted in all 22 broad policy areas that are 
distinguished in the codebook of the Comparative Agenda Setting project, 
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with the exceptions of defence and immigration. If one takes into account that 
the codebook has initially been developed to code national policies, one can 
appreciate the scope of the Special EBs.  
 
The effort to seek public opinion through Special EBs however is not equally 
distributed across policy areas, however. Some topics receive more attention 
than others. Generally speaking, citizens are not often invited to voice their 
opinion where the EU either already has far reaching competencies, such as 
external trade and competition or which are clearly in the (sub-)national 
domain, such as public lands and water management. Citizen input is 
foremost sought in in areas of shared competencies, in particular those area 
where the EU has gained competencies relatively late. Perhaps strikingly, 
however, as mentioned above, there has never been a Special EB on 
immigration. 
 
In terms of policy characteristics, we see Special EBs in particular in the area 
of regulation (e.g. health regulation, consumer protection, social rights). 
Although this fits the notion of the EU as regulatory state (e.g. Majone 1996) 
we find it worth mentioning that in redistributive areas in which the EU has 
competencies  citizens  are  ‘kept  silent’.  
 
We also see a large variation as to the DGs on whose behalf the Special EBs 
are conducted. DG Communication, DG Employment and Social Affairs, and 
DG Health and Consumer Affairs are responsible for almost half of all Special 
EBs. Most DGs who focus on economic issues and issues of external affairs 
almost never request Special EB.  When economic issues are touched upon 
such as single market issues, the survey is requested by a DG that focuses in 
particular  on   the   citizens’  perspective:  DG  Health  and  Consumer instead of 
DG Internal Market or DG Enterprise.  
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We are aware that this paper is no more than the first cut on the phenomenon 
Special Eurobarometer. The paper raises interesting puzzles that merit further 
research. How can we explain the curvilinear relationship between the degree 
of EU competencies and the frequency of Special Eurobarometers? The fact 
that the European Commission almost never enquires into areas where 
competencies are clearly national fits the image of an institution that is both 
responsive and aware of (the limits of) its competencies. But if the 
Commission   is   indeed   responsive,   why   does   it   seldom   ask   the   citizens’  
opinion in areas where it has a lot of competencies and in areas of shared 
competencies that concern redistribution. If, on the contrary, the Commission 
is a competence-maximizing agent, we would understand why it has little 
appetite to inquire into areas where it already has assumed far reaching 
competencies. But why then does the Commission display no stronger effort 
in some areas that are (still) in the national domain? Can variation be 
explained by characteristics of the policy area and the likelihood of getting 
results that are to the liking of the Commission? Can this explain why the 
Commission eschews surveys on redistributive issues, hence those that 
relatively visibly produce winners and losers, which may result in 
unfavourable answers as they test the solidarity of citizens, as well as on 
immigration  issues  which  may  be  classified  as  too  “sensitive”?   
 
While these questions should make for a new and promising avenue of 
research, we want to conclude by reiterating what we see an important 
contribution   of   this   paper:   mapping   where   the   Commission   ‘produces  
salience’   or   ‘keeps the   silence’   is   of   crucial   importance   in   its   own right. 
Citizens input can only matter if it is asked for in the first place. 
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Annex: Linking EU competencies and categories of EU 
codebook19   Lisbon Treaty Agenda codes - Main topic Agenda codes - Subtopic	  (or	  ‘search	  term’)	    
Exclusive competences of European Union Customs union Banking, Finance , Internal Trade ‘Customs	  Union' 0 Competition  Banking, Finance , Internal Trade Competition Policy,  State Aid 0 Monetary policy for the Euro-countries Macro-economics European Monetary System (Euro) 6 The conservation of marine biological resources  Agriculture and Fisheries ‘Common	  Fisheries	  policy' 0 Common Commercial Policy (External trade ) Foreign Trade  3 
Shared competences Internal market  Banking, Finance , Internal Trade All, except Consumer Protection, Tourism, Competition, State Aid  21 Social policy, as defined in TFEU Labour and Employment Worker Safety and Protection, Working Conditions 5 Economic, social and territorial cohesion;  Social Policy ‘European	  Social	  Fund' (1) 2 Regional Policy Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds (1) Agriculture and fisheries, excl. Cons. of mar.res. Agriculture and Fisheries All,	  except	  ‘Common	  Fisheries	  Policies’ 28 Environment Environment  22 Consumer protection Banking, Finance , Internal Trade Consumer Protection 14 Transport Transportation  7 Energy Energy  14 Area of Freedom, Security and Justice  Civil rights, Minority Issues, Civil Liberties (18)  39 Law and Order (21)   Immigration (0)  Public health as defined in TFEU Health Subtopics dealing with  public health issues 28   
                                                        19 According to the codebook, the five Special	   EB’s	   on	   EU	   citizen’s	   perception	   of	   German	  reunification fall	  into	  ‘Public	  Lands	  and	  Watermanagement’	  as	  they	  concern	  territorial	  issues.	  We	  excluded them here because we believe that they do not really deal with (sub-) national issues as 
understood	  here.	  As	  similar	  reasoning	  applies	  to	  two	  Special	  EB’s	  on	  Europe of the Regions, In 
our	   view,	   they	   should	   neither	   be	   coded	   as	   part	   of	   “Housing	   and	   Urban	   Development”	   nor	   as	  
“Cohesion	   Policy”.	  We	   added	   five	   Special	   EB’s	   about	   ‘Sport’.	   These	   EB	   fall	   under	   the	   category	  
‘Miscellaneous’,	   a	   category	   this	   is	   as	   such	   excluded because the themes are too general (see 
Footnote	  8),	  but	  we	  felt	  that	  these	  five	  EB’s	  are	  specific	  enough	  to	  be	  included	  here.	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Research, technological development and space  Space, Science Technology and Communication  33 Development cooperation and humanitarian aid International Affairs and Foreign Aid Foreign Aid 18 
Specific arrangements  Coordination of economic policies Macro-economics All, except Monetary Policy  7 Co-ordination of employment policies  Labour and Employment All. except Worker Safety and Protection, Working Conditions 8 Coordination of social policy Social Policy All, except 'Social Fund' 12 Common foreign and security policy International Affairs All, except Foreign Aid (6)  6  Defence (020)   
Exclusive national competencies 
 Protection and improvement of human health Health All, except public health issues 10 Culture Culture and Media  3 Tourism  Banking, Finance , Internal Trade Tourism 2 Education, vocational training, youth and sport  Education (6)  10 Miscellaneous ‘	  Sport'	  (4) Civil protection;  EU Governance and Government Operations Civil Protection 1 [Housing and Urban Development]  Regional and Urban Policy and Planning All, except Europe of the Region and Structural Funds 0 [Public Lands and Watermanagement] Public Lands, Watermanagement and Territorial Issues  All,  except territorial Issues 0  
 
                                                        20 To be sure, one Special EB on defence has been carried out. However, it was not on behalf of the European Commission, but on behalf of the Belgian Minister of Defence. 
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